In recent years, cost-sensitive intrusion response has gained significant interest mainly due to its emphasis on the balance between potential damage incurred by the intrusion and cost of the response. However, one of the challenges in applying this approach is defining consistent and adaptable measurements of these cost factors on the basis of requirements and policy of the system being protected against intrusions.
Introduction
The proliferation of complex and fast-spreading intrusions against computer systems brought new requirements to intrusion detection and response systems, demanding not only advances in intrusion detection mechanisms but also the development of sophisticated and automated intrusion response systems.
The majority of existing automatic intrusion response systems rely on the mapping of attacks to predefined responses [19, 20] . These approaches allow the system administrator to deal with intrusions faster and more efficiently. However, they lack flexibility mainly because few of these systems take intrusion cost factors into account.
In recent years the trend toward cost-sensitive modeling of response selection has become more apparent [13, 5, 9, 28, 21, 27] . The primary aim for applying such models is to balance intrusion damage and response cost to ensure adequate response without sacrificing the normal functionality of the system under attack. In this context, the common challenges are defining an accurate measurement of cost factors and ensuring their consistent evaluation in varied computing environments.
Problem Statement. The traditional approach to the selection of intrusion response is based on an intuitive assessment of various factors such as intrusion likelihood and severity, extent of the potential intrusion damage, effectiveness of suitable response actions, and expected duration of the response. This process is typically conducted by a system administrator. However, it is generally ineffective in automated response systems and real-time applications, not only due to extensive human involvement, but also due to its reliance on expert knowledge. One of the concerns in this context is imprecise judgement and the varied intuition displayed by system administrators during response selection, which often results in inconsistency in the assessment of intrusion response impact.
While various factors influencing the assessment of response actions have been incorporated in existing models supporting automated intrusion response, a unified and justifiable approach is yet to be developed.
The difficulty lies mainly in the lack of a common interpretation of these factors and the absence of concrete metrics with clear conceptual meaning to quantify them. For example, most of the existing models supporting automated response selection introduce response cost as one of the factors in the selection of the suitable response strategy. However, they generally do not agree on what constitutes response cost and how it can be measured. Some researchers suggest that response cost includes the labor cost of personnel involved in response deployment and criticality of the attack [13] , others see response cost as a measure of response effectiveness to a detected attack and its disruptiveness to legitimate users [9] .
The goal of this work is to develop a standardized approach to intrusion response assessment and provide a unified framework for consistent and adaptable response selection in the context of organization's security policies.
Solution Methodology. In light of the above discussion, we present a framework for the cost-sensitive assessment of intrusion response. Within this framework, we introduce a set of measurements to characterize potential costs associated with the intrusion handling process in terms of the risk of potential intrusion damage, effectiveness of response action and response cost for a system. We develop a model to assess these factors with respect to the resources of the affected system, and select the optimal response. Our model takes into account the relative importance of system resources determined through system policy goals, according to three main security facets: confidentiality, availability and integrity.
With the proposed framework we offer a generalized yet system aware assessment mechanism that allows the consistent analysis of response measures for any attack in the context of the security policies of the enterprise system. While this work is targeted toward automated applications, it can also assist administrators in the assessment of response actions with respect to the assets and policies of the organization.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1. Consistent and adaptable response metrics: the proposed model outlines evaluation metrics defined in terms of system resources that bring a common ground to the assessment process. At the same time, the response metrics are quantified with respect to the security policies and properties of the specific system which allows the computed costs to be effortlessly adjusted as and when the system requirements are modified.
2. Structured and comprehensive methodology for assigning response metrics: the proposed model is the first attempt toward an effective roadmap for defining a standardized metric for response cost evaluation.
3. System aware model for response selection: the proposed model is adaptable to different environment settings, i.e. systems with varying operational requirements. In contrast to the majority of existing approaches which offer intrusion specific response selection [25] , our framework provides a generalized assessment mechanism that allows one to analyze response measures for any attack in the context of the security policies of the given system. 4 . Practical implementability: the work provides a step-by-step assessment process that allows system administrators with a broad range of skill levels to deploy this approach.
Organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a review of related work in this area. Then we present our framework and detail the response selection process in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of the response selection implementation steps required, while Section 5 presents our experimental results. We provide a discussion of the limitations of our approach in Section 6 and conclude with the discussion of the opportunities for further development in Section 7.
Related Work
A number of techniques aiming at enhancing intrusion response automation were proposed and deployed over the last five years. A comprehensive review of this research work is given by [22, 8] . Response cost assessment research is still in its infancy compared to the broader field of intrusion detection.
The approach to intrusion response proposed by Lee et al. [13] is based on a combination of intrusion detection and response factors. Three cost factors were identified: operational cost which includes the cost of processing and analyzing data for detecting the intrusion, damage cost which assesses the amount of damage that could potentially be caused by the attack and response cost which characterizes the operational cost of reaction to the intrusion. These factors comprise the foundation of the intrusion cost model, i.e. total expected cost of intrusion detection, and consequently provide a basis for the selection of an appropriate response.
Another approach called ADEPTS, Adaptive Intrusion Response using Attack Graphs, proposed by Foo et al. [9] , employs attack graphs to identify the actions required to achieve possible attack goals in a distributed system, showing the objectives of suitable responses. Goals are expressed as end states in the attack graph with intermediate steps leading to their fulfillment. Responses are selected to frustrate attack goals based on effectiveness to that particular attack in the past, disruptiveness to legitimate users and the confidence level which indicates the probability that the attack is actually taking place. The extension of this work, which provides a framework for considering the global optimal response in distributed environment, is presented in [29] .
Models proposed by Toth and Kruegel [24] , Jahnke [12] , and Balepin et al. [5] not only consider costs and benefits of the responses, but also introduce a link between the cost of responses and the system resources in the network.
The approach proposed by Toth and Kruegel is a network-based response mechanism that builds a dependency tree of the resources on the network. The proposed algorithm for optimal response selection takes into account the penalty cost of a resource being unavailable and the capability of a resource which indicates the performance change if the specified response strategy is triggered, compared to the situation when all resources are available. Clearly, the set of responses with the least negative impact on the system (lowest penalty cost) is chosen to be applied in response to the detected intrusion.
An approach proposed by Jahnke [12] also attempts to quantify response measures based on modeling system resources as a dependency graph. Although this method requires careful graph construction and validation, it allows automatic assessment of the response success computed through the change of the availability of resource nodes in the graph and required effort or cost defined as the number of instances to be modified for deploying the selected response.
A similar approach, for host-based intrusion detection and response, was proposed by Balepin et al. [5] .
The local resource hierarchy is modeled as a directed graph where the nodes represent specific system resources and the edges are the dependencies between them. Each node is associated with a list of responses that can be applied to restore it to a working state, in case of an attack. A particular response for a node is selected based on (a) the cost of the response, the sum of the resources that will be affected by the response action, (b) the benefit of the response, the sum of the nodes, previously affected by intrusion that will be restored to working state, and (c) the cost of the resource, the quantification of the importance of the resource.
While all these works attempt to address intrusion response selection, each has its limitations. In our work, we attempt to generalize the response assessment process and address the following issues:
• The existing models are system dependent. Most of these approaches focus on networks of systems [9, 24, 12] , with only few considering host-based response [13, 5] . However, with the exception of [5] , they are all specifically designed to reflect characteristics of the considered system. This significantly limits the applicability of the models to varying system constraints, and thus, their practicality. In this work we propose a common methodology for response cost estimation that is adaptable to different environment settings.
For example, the ADEPTS system is very well tuned for automated response in a distributed webbased environment. It relies on two mappings, the I-DAG which models the goals and intermediate steps of attacks, and the SNet which models service relationships within the system. Because ADEPTS was designed with a web-based service architecture in mind, there is an implicit assumption that the structures of these graphs are fairly stable. However, since this assumption would not hold in a number of environments, e.g. mobile ad-hoc network environment, deplying ADEPTS in different setting might require significant modification.
By comparison, our approach is flexible enough to incorporate system engineer intuition into a model of the impact of both responses and intrusions in a particular environment.
• The existing models only partially outline the factors involved in the response selection process. While most of these approaches use the concept of response benefit or effectiveness as a factor related to the response's ability to mitigate the intrusion, the operational cost of the response as well as its potential negative impact on a system are not considered.
Without including all factors, non-intuitive responses may be selected in certain cases. For instance, neglecting the operational cost of an intrusion may lead to a system which cannot adequately account for post-incident analysis costs associated with low-severity intrusions such as a web directory traversal attack. In this case, neglecting the operational cost of an intrusion (e.g., the baseline reporting cost) may lead to a system which prefers a monetarily costly response among otherwise equal measures that do not cause much system damage and have similar mitigating effect on intrusion.
By including factors which model system damage and operational costs for both intrusions and re-sponses, as well as capturing the protective value of a response both in terms of preventing the intrusion completely and partially mitigating intrusion damage, our approach is capable of more comprehensively representing the intuition of system administrators and owners.
• The existing models lack consistency with each other. Each model approaches response cost evaluation and selection from a different perspective. Foo et al. [9] measures the response effectiveness against a detected attack based on the past experience. Lee et al. [13] relates the response cost to the required labor efforts. The works by [24] , [5] and [12] consider response cost in association with the system resources, but offering varying evaluation methods. The solution in [5] measures the response cost as the sum of manually assigned costs of affected resources. Alternatively, [24] calculates response cost as a function of system capability reduction, while [12] essentially extends the idea in [24] by adding a fine-grained quantification of system resource unavailability.
Inconsistency is not a technical problem with a particular approach, but rather it prevents adoption of an approach because of the "lock-in" entailed. When an organization invests time into gathering data and defining parameters for one approach, that effort should be applicable to other approaches as well.
For instance, consider the models proposed by Balepin et al. [5] and Lee et al. [13] , respectively. The approach by [5] requires the estimation of state probability tables and transitions. However, this (considerable) effort is not applicable when an organization decides to apply approach developed by [13] , which places more emphasis on attack graphs and generalized global damage calculations.
Even were the concepts interchangeable, the lack of units and arbitrary scale of the values used would make it difficult to apply the estimates generated from one approach to the formulas in the other.
Our work is a step toward bridging this gap by providing a basic formulation in which computed damage/protection estimates from other approaches can be used, and the results of which can be compared regardless of the estimation method used. While we provide a suggested estimation approach in this work, the probability tables of [5] or the SNet model results of ADEPTS can also be employed to generate the values used in our formulas.
The emerging theme in the surveyed projects effectively establishes the idea of employing system resources in the evaluation of intrusion responses, and based on this promising trend we build our approach to response selection on a model of system resources. In this context, our work can be viewed as a generalization of the existing approaches.
As opposed to the models mentioned above, a high-level conceptual view of risk assessment for intrusion response has been introduced by [10] . The framework developed in [10] essentially presented the perceived risk of system exposure to intrusions as a variable that can be guided by tolerable level of risk threshold.
In this context, selecting a cost effective response can be viewed as choosing the countermeasure that can restore the level of exposure to the tolerable risk level. While this formal model lays down several theoretical properties for response selection, it primarily addresses the change in permissions as a response measure, thus limiting its applicability to a large pool of intrusion response systems. On the other hand, while providing high-level concepts of benefit and cost, the model fails to give guidelines on calculation of these metrics, limiting the implementability of the approach. In contrast, our model incorporates practical metrics that can be employed by system and network administrators.
While the approaches mentioned above consider response within the framework of intrusion handling, there is an alternative view of intrusion countermeasures assessment based on the return-on-investment (ROI) [4] . ROI is one of the commonly used metrics to estimate the efficiency of organization's security solution investments. While ROI also aims to evaluate benefits of the intrusion countermeasures, it follows different goals. First, ROI analysis focuses on security products (e.g., firewall, intrusion detection system) rather than specific response measures. As a result the approach requires voluminous data to provide accurate assessment and is not applicable for real-time intrusion handling. Geared toward managerial decisions, ROIbased approaches primarily employ dollar amounts, presenting vague guidance for system administrators tasked with response selection during a live attack. Intuitively, we need to consider practical metrics that can be easily related by system administrator to the IDS functionality.
Our aim is to preserve the strengths of the existing works while avoiding their disadvantages. Toward this end, the proposed framework identifies the major factors that constitute the response cost and provides a comprehensive step-by-step methodology for the automatic and consistent assessment of these factors, accounting for system-specific confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements.
Evaluation metrics
Traditionally, triggering an intrusion response is left as part of the administrator's responsibility. When choosing response measures and their parameters, an administrator instinctively weighs the benefits and risks of each response compared to the potential intrusion damage. Thus, the problem of intrusion response selection can be formulated as the problem of minimizing the cost of potential system damage incurred by an attack and a deployed response. Formally, given a set of intrusions I and a system damage function SD(i ∈ I), the goal is to identify the set of responses R that allow one to minimize the impact of intrusions while ensuring the least possible damage from responses' deployment.
One of the established ways to measure system damage is to consider the system resources both affected by the intrusion and protected by the response and also those negatively impacted by the deployed response strategy. We thus assess system damage based on several factors: importance of system resources, response
Step 1: Assessment of system resources:
1: System classification:
-identify the system role in the organization 2: Define system policy goals:
-assign weights to system policy goals (C,I,A) 3: Classify system resources:
-enumerate resources available on the given system -determine the resource importance for each system policy goal -compute the overall resource weight for each system policy goal
Step 2 cost and intrusion damage.
System resources are associated with organization's assets (e.g., servers, users, provided services) and thus their importance is assessed according to the security policy of the organization. Different organizations may vary in their security priorities, policies for intrusion handling, response management practices, etc. Thus, the importance of system resources is examined in the context of the specific system. The response cost is essentially a penalty associated with the response deployment that is characterized by two factors: the negative effect of a response on the system and the operational cost of the action associated with the response maintenance. Similarly, intrusion damage is assessed through the operational cost associated with various aspects of intrusion detection such as mandatory reporting requirements, cost of intrusion detection products, etc.
These components are brought together in the response selection process, which aims to identify an optimal response in the context of system resources potentially impacted by an intrusion and protected by a response.
An overview of these steps is presented in Figure 1 . In the following sections, we elaborate on these steps.
Assessment of system resources
The evaluation of system resources is performed in three steps:
System classification. The first step in quantifying system resources involves determining the characteristics of the considered computing environment. For example, the system can be classified in terms of the organizational goals as an open-access system with minor or no security restrictions (e.g., public networks provided at airport); or as a safety-critical system with emphasis on service availability. The classification process should provide important insights into the risks that each class of systems can tolerate, and therefore help in measuring the cost for various types of intrusion damages. For example, a public Web server and a financial processing system will have different sensitivities toward data confidentiality and availability. Even within a system class, security priorities can differ. For instance, a business critical Web server used to accept product orders may have very different requirements from one used to process payroll.
The system policy goals. The determination of the importance of the system policy goals and the subsequent assessment of the potential risks are the responsibilities of the organization to which the system belongs. It is usually a manual process consisting of an informal series of questions such as "Will data be exposed?", "How critical is the confidentiality of the data?", "How concerned are we with data integrity?", "Will service availability be impacted?", etc. This provides an ad-hoc relative assessment of the system policy goals for the organization. Based on the above observation, system policy goals can be defined in terms of:
• Confidentiality which refers to the imposed restrictions on information flows, e.g., restricted access to data.
• Integrity which is a guarantee of the consistency and accuracy of the information or the system computing environment as a whole.
• Availability which indicates the requirement of (functionality, storage etc.) service and information availability upon request.
These categories, namely, confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C, I, A), are ranked according to their importance in a particular system type (e.g., security-critical). The ranking decisions can be based on monetary values or other established business metrics for the cost of failure to meet system goals (e.g., the estimated dollar cost of a confidentiality breach). For instance, given an overall system value, the user can estimate how much of that value depends on the ability of the system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its data respectively.
Let the importance be expressed as a weight tuple (w C , w I , w A ) with ranges [0, 1]
1 . Then, formally, we define the security policy of system s as SP s = (w C , w I , w A ) such that 0 ≤ w {C,I,A} ≤ 1.
System resources. Responses are reactions to the intrusions and are directed to protect the system resources threatened by an attack. System resources can be broadly viewed as the organizational assets,
anything that can be of a value to an enterprise such as hosts, networks, software, users, services provided by the system (e.g., FTP, HTTP, file system, etc.).
One of the initial steps in the process for assessing system resources is the enumeration of the resources available in the considered system. The importance of a resource depends on the system policy goals which in turn depend on the system type. For example, for a simple Web server, availability is an important policy goal and accordingly important resources will include the HTTP service.
An inventory of company assets is often maintained through an IT asset management system [26] . If such a system is implemented, then the criticality values of assets, i.e., the importance of system resources, according to CIA security requirements, are also available through this system [26] . The following process details the computation of system resource importance in case these values are not freely available.
System resources, denoted by SR = (sr 1 , sr 2 , . . . , sr z ) are assigned weights, according to their importance for each policy goal in a specific system. The overall weight of the system resource, denoted by W srj , is computed as a combination of the resource importance for system goals F {C,I,A} (sr j ) and the weight of these three factors for the security policy of system w {C,I,A} .
To illustrate this process, consider an example of the network interface resource and its importance for each policy category for a public Web server: Table 1 . Public Web server example: network interface resource.
1 The listing of all employed parameters is given in Appendix A
Assessment of Response Cost
Intuitively, the intrusion response cost is the cost required to deploy a response measure on a given system.
While the responses are deployed against a detected intrusion, they often alter the state of the system, negatively affecting system resources and leading to damage. For example, complete network isolation of a Web server in response to an SQL Injection attack, although effectively stopping the intrusion, also results in unavailability of other services. While such an intrusion response might be desirable in a security-critical system, it is unacceptable in a service-oriented setting.
Another factor that contributes to the cost of response deployment is the operational cost of the response in the form of administrator time and additional system resources (i.e., storage, network bandwidth, etc.) required for response setup and processing. Similar to the response effect on the system, operational cost does not directly affect the detected intrusion; however, it can significantly influence the decision of which response to deploy.
Given a set of available response actions denoted as R = (r 1 , . . . , r n ), the cost of a response r g is estimated along two dimensions: the operational cost of a response in a given environment and the response impact on the system.
Response operational cost. The assessment of response operational cost is generally independent from the system policy and includes the cost for the setup and deployment of the response, and data processing overhead needed to analyze the result of response. For example, the "additional system logging" response is fairly easy to setup. However, it may require significant storage resources and often incurs high processing overhead. Broadly, the involved operational expenses can be classified on the basis of three requirements:
human resources which refer to administrator time, system resources, which include storage, network bandwidth, processor time, etc., and direct expenses which include data processing fees by a third party, subscription service fees, cost of components replacement, etc. Determining these factors is a manual process that involves expert knowledge and a high degree of judgment.
In the risk-assessment field these costs are usually expressed as monetary values, however, in other areas a more effective solution appears to be an application of relative measurements [13] . In our context, we also resort to the latter approach and assign a relative measure to the operational cost of a response r g , denoted as OC(r g ), with the normalized value in the range [0, 1].
Response impact on the system. The impact of a response is evaluated based on the defined system goals and their importance. From a practical standpoint, assessing the absolute value of response impact might be difficult to estimate and meaningless for a system administrator. However, providing the relative magnitude of a response impact in comparison to other considered responses is a more intuitive approach that is generally followed by system administrators in their intrusion response assessment. We leverage this expertise in the response selection process and provide a formal basis for an automatic approach to an intrusion response impact on system resources.
The impact assessment process for a specific response includes three steps: (1) identify the system resources affected by each response; (2) for each resource, order the responses on the basis of how they are affecting the resource; and (3) compute the negative impact of the responses on the associated resource using the ordering obtained above. Thus, the impact of a response on the system as a whole is an aggregation of the response's impact on the resources present in the system.
For each response we determine the system resources it may affect. For instance, blocking a specific subnet can protect the network interface resource and also disrupt legitimate user activities. After all responses are categorized within the considered system resource, we independently evaluate each system resource.
Specifically, all responses affecting the resource are ordered or ranked based on their relative impact on the considered resource, from the greatest impact to the least impact, and assigned an index g ∈ [0 . .
where h is the total number of responses in the list corresponding to a particular resource. A response with rank g has more impact on the corresponding resource than the response with rank t, if (g < t). These ranks are based on historical data and/or the expertise of the system administrator. We quantify the impact using the rank as follows:
where r g is the g-th ranked response. The resultant valuation is between 1 h and 1. To illustrate this process, let us consider the public Web server example given in Table 1 . The available responses are ranked according to their impact on the network interface resource sr j and the corresponding impact quantification is computed as follows: Generally, the ranking values are dependent on the characteristics of the system environment. As such, changes in the environment (e.g., modifications in software usage, the addition of network equipment, new knowledge or skills gained by the administrator) can affect the order and relative severity of the responses.
Thus, as the settings of the environment change, these values may be manually adjusted to more accurately reflect relative damage on the system resources. These changes however will automatically propagate through the response cost assessment system and will not require any further manual adjustment.
The overall impact of the response measure is estimated based on the weight of the system resource for a specific system policy (Equation 1) and the impact value of the response for that resource (Equation 2).
The overall rating of the response r g on the system, the response system impact, denoted by RSI(r g ), is computed as follows:
The described assessment of response impact of system resources does not implicitly account for resource dependencies unless the system administrator incorporates this in the process of response impact ranking, e.g., by lowering or increasing corresponding response ranking for a dependant resource. There have been a number of projects focusing specifically on modeling system resources dependencies for intrusion detection including [24, 12] . These techniques can potentially be incorporated in our proposed response selection system.
Based on the defined measures: the response operational cost OC(r g ) and the response impact on the system RSI(r g ), the cost of a response RC(r g ) can be expressed as follows:
Assessment of Intrusion Cost
Intrusion cost is the damage caused by an occurring attack detected by the IDS. Generally estimating the actual damage of an attack incident is a part of the risk-based assessment of organization's security solutions [4] . While accurate measurement of damages for specific attacks is not always possible, the organization can still establish the average damage estimates.
Similar to intrusion response cost, system damage caused by an attack is defined using two components:
operational cost and intrusion impact on system resources. As opposed to response impact on system resources, intrusion impact on the system, aside from mandatory operational costs, is challenging to predict. We thus follow a conservative approach and assume that if an intrusion can damage a resource, then it will damage that system resource. We evaluate the intrusion impact with regards to the response ability to counter this damage. Specifically, the intrusion impact is taken into account during the dynamic response selection, where we assess, for each response measure, the degree to which it can protect each resource from each intrusion (see Section 4, Equation 7).
Intrusion Response Selection
The goal of the intrusion response selection process is to identify a response adequate to mitigate the intrusion damage in the context of the current system environment. To ensure this goal, the selection process follows three steps:
1. selection of the candidate response set : the set of response actions that can be generally deployed against the considered intrusion.
2. estimation of response effectiveness: analysis of the ability of the candidate response to mitigate intrusion damage.
3. invocation of the optimal response: selection of the most effective response against the most likely intrusion.
These steps present a dynamic selection of the appropriate response measures after the intrusion alarm was received, and thus, are fully dependent on the environment context at the time of intrusion. However, the assessment of system resources and costs of available intrusion response measures and potential intrusions are essentially static values for a given system and thus should be predetermined in advance.
The following sections elaborate on the intrusion response selection process.
Step 1: selection of the candidate response set. The first step in the intrusion handling process is to determine which response action to deploy. The applicability of a response in a particular context, or in other words, its ability to mitigate damage caused by the intrusion to system resources, can be resolved through an analysis of the system resources which are both potentially affected by an intrusion and protected by the response.
The correspondence between the effect of intrusions on system resources and responses on system resources is maintained in binary matrices. To provide finer granularity, the correspondence is given in terms of three security facets: confidentiality C, availability A and integrity I. As such, an intrusion matrix indicates the resources that can be affected by the considered intrusions. In practice, the evaluation of potential attacks can be performed through the analysis of the enabled signatures in the employed intrusion detection system. This evaluation can be carried out for categories of intrusions or with the use of an ontology or a resource dependency graph (See [16, 17] ).
An intrusion matrix is formally defined as IM = [im j,k ] j=1,...,z;k=1,...,m , where z rows correspond to system resources and m columns specify considered intrusions. Then, im j,k is given as binary triple {i jk (C), i jk (A), i jk (I)} indicating a possible effect of intrusion i k on system resource sr j in terms of the loss of confidentiality i jk (C), availability i jk (A) and integrity i jk (I).
Similarly, a response matrix indicates the ability of a response action to protect the specified resources and is given as RM = [rm j,g ] j=1,...,z;g=1,...,n , where n columns denote the available responses r g . Examples of these matrices are given in Figure 3 .
For example, the values along column 1 in intrusion matrix correspond to intrusion i 1 affecting system resources sr 1 , sr 2 , sr 3 , . . . , sr j . In this case, the value in cell im 1,1 = {0, 1, 1} shows that intrusion i 1 does not affect the confidentiality of resource sr 1 , but potentially damages its availability and integrity.
The candidate response set is formed through the response and intrusion matrices and includes a set of responses that protect system resources that can be potentially damaged by a suspected intrusion. Formally,
given an intrusion i k , the set of system resources potentially affected by the intrusion is SR
. While the set of system resources that can be protected by response r g is given as SR rg pr = {sr j : rm j,g = {r jg (C) = 1 ∨ r jg (A) = 1 ∨ r jg (I) = 1}}.
Then the set of candidate response actions R c for a suspected intrusion i s is
Step 2: Estimation of response effectiveness. Intuitively, the expected effectiveness of a response measure is the amount of potential intrusion damage the response might prevent. While the set of candidate responses includes all response measures that are generally applicable for a suspected intrusion, the effectiveness of individual responses may vary depending on the specific attack context (e.g., attack probability, past response deployment outcome, etc.). Thus, the response effectiveness is estimated based on several factors:
• Intrusion detection reliability. The accuracy of the intrusion detection primarily depends on the intrusion detection reliability R(IDS), in other words, its ability to correctly identify the attack in a timely
fashion. An evaluation of IDS reliability is estimated based on a variety of factors, with the most basic being false alarm rate, detection rate, IDS capability, expected cost, etc. [6, 11] . These factors generally relate to classification accuracy of intrusion detector. Such an assessment is performed by the system administrator and essentially allows one to evaluate the quality of various detection tools 2 .
• The probability of intrusion. The probability of intrusion p i is the likelihood that the intrusion is occurring. As opposed to R(IDS), which provides an external assessment of the detector accuracy, a probability of intrusion corresponds to the detector's confidence in an intrusion identification. For example, such confidence can be acquired through a degree to which an event is matched to an attack signature or the number of intrusion detection rules triggered (e.g., via hierarchical attack signatures [23] ). The concept of hierarchical attack signatures is implemented in many network security management devices (e.g. [18] ) and allows the escalation of alert severity in the presence of additional conditions or to correlate alerts into meaningful attack scenarios. For example, a few failed login alerts followed by an attempted root privilege alert will boost the probability of a privilege escalation attack.
In this work we assume that the intrusion probability is an assigned value provided by the IDS as an input along with an alert 3 .
• Response success rate against detected intrusion. As opposed to the previous two factors, the response success rate, denoted as SF(r g , i), relates to the expected response performance and indicates how successful was the response in countering this intrusion in the past. Let Pr success (r, i) be the percentage of successful deployments of response r g in handling the intrusion i and S level be the success level that denotes an estimate of how successful response r g is in handling intrusion i, then SF(r g , i) can be computed as follows:
Generally, the common approach to response success quantification is the differentiation of two response outcomes: response success, if the deployed response achieved the expected result (e.g., blocked intrusion, collected the data), and response failure, otherwise. One of the limitations of this approach is the inability of the response system to distinguish intrusion steps disabled as a result of response which may later result in a response wastefully deployed to counter some of the disabled intrusive behaviors.
Another limitation lies on the response side, as the intrusion response is often represented by a set of multi-targeted actions, labeling such response strategy as failed essentially indicates that none of the response actions succeeded, which also underestimates the value of the deployed response.
While for the purpose of this work we adopt a common view of the response outcome, considering more complex strategies employing partial response success is an interesting research direction. As such we consider success level as a binary variable which takes a value of 0 in case of response failure and a value of 1 if the response succeeds.
• Response coverage. The response coverage characterizes the degree of expected protection against a suspected intrusion. This is subtly different from the expectation of success expressed by SF(r g , i).
In this case we are primarily interested in the degree to which the resource security facets {C,I,A}will be protected by a response, not the likelihood that the intrusion will be entirely prevented. Formally, response coverage Cov(r g , i) is given as follows
The response coverage considers only resource security facets X ∈ {C,I,A}impacted by intrusion, im j,k = {i jk (X) = 1} and whether the response protection is offered for them. In cases, when the response protection exists, the value is weighted by the overall importance of the security facet for the system.
The established factors are combined together in the response effectiveness Eff which is calculated as follows:
The response effectiveness Eff is essentially a response benefit that incorporates intrusion operational cost considered in terms of baseline operational cost OC b (i) dependent on the probability of the intrusion incidence p and reliability of IDS R(IDS) and actual operational cost OC a (i) that can potentially be avoided (at least partially) if damage from suspected intrusion is mitigated.
Step 3: Invocation of the optimal response. The objective of cost-sensitive response selection is to determine an optimal response that, in a given context, balances the costs involved in intrusion handling and the potential benefits of deploying a response.
The optimal response strategy is determined through the evaluation of the response expected value that is essentially the difference between the benefit of the response and the possible damage it may cause (response cost ). In other words, expected value of a response is a quantification of its ability to mitigate damage without incurring other damages to the system. The benefit of response is computed through the effectiveness parameter Eff(r g , I s ) (see Equation 10 ), while the response cost is evaluated based on the operational cost of a response in a given environment and the response impact on the system (see Equation 4 ). Based on the factors analyzed above, the expected value of the response r g for a set of suspected intrusions I s , denoted as EV(r g , I s ) is estimated as follows:
Based on the estimated system state, the response is chosen to maximize the benefit Eff(r g , I s ), and consequently, the calculated expected value EV. Then, to minimize the potential damage on the system SD incurred by suspected set of IDS intrusions I, the goal of the response engine is to select set of responses R ′′ that maximize the response benefit while ensuring the least possible damage from intrusions and response deployment, which is formally defined as
Experimental results
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we have implemented our response selection framework as a plugin tool for Snort IDS and performed a series of experiments with the simulated DARPA data set and real network traffic collected at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Ames Laboratory. In these experiments, we compared our cost-sensitive response selection approach to a static response system implementing a static response: 'block IP address through the firewall'. As opposed to a dynamic response selection utilized by our framework, the static response system automatically maps an alert to a pre-defined response, and as such does not consider response costs for a particular intrusion, potential damage to the system, past success rate, etc.
This section concludes with the analysis of the practical value of our approach for system administrators.
Intrusion response selection assessment
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we have implemented our response selection framework as a plugin tool for intrusion detection system (IDS) and performed a series of experiments focusing on two issues: the cost-benefit advantage of the approach and its scalability.
System legend: public web server providing remote access for affiliates and public information System security priorities: low confidentiality 0.1, moderate integrity 0.5, high availability 0.9.
System legend: central file repository for distributed collaboration System security priorities: moderate confidentiality 0.5, high integrity 0.9, low availability 0.1.
System legend: Medical data input system for a hospital System security priorities: high confidentiality 0.9, high integrity 0.9, low availability 0.1.
System Resources: System responses: Table 2 . The characteristics of the hypothetical systems used in the experiments with DARPA data set.
The effect of cost-sensitive response selection. We evaluated our model using the 1998 DARPA/Lincoln
Lab offline evaluation data, in particular week 6 , and an open-source, signature-based Snort IDS [1].
In these experiments we focused on the effect of the cost-sensitive selection of the response on systems with different security policy emphasis. The characteristics of these systems are given in Table 2 . As a primary criteria we defined a cumulative response cost metric that shows the cumulative value of all deployed system responses. The results of the experiments in comparison to the traditional system equipped with static intrusion response mechanism are given in Figures 4, 5 , and 6.
Our cost-sensitive approach clearly outperforms the static response. While initially the cumulative response value taken by our cost-sensitive approach and the system with static response is similarly small, as the number of the deployed responses increases, the difference in cost becomes significant.
Performance. We have conducted a set of experiments to measure the performance of the intrusion response selection algorithm on the artificial data sets. The experiments were run on Intel(R) Core(TM)2
Duo CPU U7700 with CPU of 1.33GHz and 1 GB of RAM. The experiments were performed for three primary parameters: a number of system resources, a number of intrusion responses available in the system and a number of suspected intrusions. During the experimentation with each parameter, two other parameters remained fixed at value 100. The results of these experiments given in Figure 7 show that even for a system with a significantly large number of resources to consider (10000), the computation time for the best response strategy is only 0.015s. For smaller systems with 1000 defined system resources, the computation time is less than 5µs, which is reasonable for even inline IDS. As Figure 7 shows, the highest impact on performance has the number of suspected intrusions simultaneously considered during the response selection process. As such it took 0.221s to assess the available responses for 10000 suspected intrusions. While we considered significantly large sets of intrusions in the experiments, in reality there are generally only a few possible simultaneous intrusions to consider.
The results show that our approach has reasonable processing time requirements that we consider suitable for the efficient analysis of response selection both for manual assessment during an administrator's daily routine, as well as in automatic setting.
Experiments with real network traffic
For our experiments we collected network traffic from the DOE Ames Laboratory during seven consecutive days in 2009. This traffic was replayed through a Snort IDS engine with the developed response plugin resulting in approximately 12 million alerts. The real data experiment consisted of 36 defined intrusions which were candidates for automated response. The OC b value was defined to be 0.1, signifying an approximate cost of 10% of the overall system value for each reportable incident. This includes performing a full system analysis, generating and submitting the paperwork, and tracking corrective actions. OC a values are varied based on the severity and type of compromise. For instance, the OC a value for the intrusion WEB-ROOT DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL is defined at 0.2, since a successful directory traversal by an attacker would require an analyst to determine which files were accessed, the sensitivity of the accessed data, and initiate recovery procedures (e.g., password changing).
The system policy and system resources in this experiment were setup to reflect the Ames Laboratory security policy with the system integrity given the highest importance. Due to the nature of the Laboratory In this experiment we analyze the costs involved in the intrusion handling process and the potential benefits of deploying a cost-sensitive response in real setting. Therefore, response selection is assessed with respect to an overall expected value for a system (Equation 10). Figure 8 shows the cumulative expected value for static response system and for a selection made by our cost-sensitive approach. The result shows that the cumulative expected value steadily increases as more responses are selected and deployed through cost-sensitive analysis compared to static scheme. Note that expected value of a response is essentially quantification of its ability to mitigate damage without incurring other damages to the system, thus, the higher the expected cost the more beneficial the response is.
An interesting insight of this difference was revealed through a detailed analysis of the system response decisions. Although the static response of block IP address is effective for most network-based attacks, it is overly protective in some cases, as the same result can be achieved with less costly, but equally effective responses (e.g., Web-based attacks, to which our response selection system chooses 'Block Attacker's address in .htaccess file' response rather than putting in a global IP address block). While a conservative approach in sensitive environments like the Ames Lab is justifiable, it shows the area where cost-sensitive assessment can be successfully employed.
Evaluation by system administrators
To evaluate the practical value of our approach, we conducted an experiment where we asked system administrators to rank the set of response actions using their traditional methods according to responses' priority to be deployed on the system. For this exercise we recruited 6 system administrators with different levels of expertise (4 experts and 2 with moderate level of expertise). In the experiment we offered two types of system: web server threatened by SQL injection attack and medical file server undergoing a potential buffer overflow attack. Each system was provided with the default scenario that included system's CIA parameters, a set of responses, a set of system resources and a suspected intrusion. The administrators were given an option to customize a given scenario by adding/removing actions/resources or by adjusting system parameters. In each case, administrators were asked to rank the intrusion responses according to their relative impact on the CIA facets of each system resource and order the responses according to their relative ability to protect these facets of system resource. The response selection system calculation was done based on these provided rankings. In addition to this, the administrators were asked to rank the available intrusion responses according to their preference to be deployed in a given context. After this step, the The motivation for the experiment was to evaluate the consistency of the response cost assessment using our methodology in comparison with the traditional approach primarily based on the manual selection of responses according to the administrator expertise.
Surprisingly, the results showed a substantial variability in the response ranking among administrators.
The Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between any two rankings are in the range of {−0.1, 0.6} with the average of 0.28 4 . This means that on average, experts ranking is not very consistent neither among experienced administrators, nor among administrators with moderate level of expertise. The rank order correlation coefficients between the ranking generated by our approach and the corresponding administrator's ranking are generally stronger with the values varying in the range of {0.1, 0.9} with the average value of 0.5. As one of the responders noted, the response ranking provided by our method characterized a smooth process for system administrators to follow during a suspected attack, while his personal response preference is an overreaction to the situation.
This provides strong testimony that even experienced administrators need a standardized metric for evaluating intrusion responses that would allow them to assess the costs involved in each response deployment in a consistent manner.
To investigate the usability of the proposed approach, we asked participants to provide feedback on their attitude toward using this approach in their daily routine. The general consensus was that although there are some barriers including the psychological ones to enabling fully automated intrusion response system, the approach should be employed as a guiding tool throughout the response selection process.
Our work is the initial step in the direction of establishing standardized response metrics and allowing for unified approach to consistent and adaptable cost-sensitive response selection.
To gain a better insight into the advantages and obstacles of the proposed approach, the production version of the cost-sensitive response selection system was implemented and deployed in the Ames Lab network. This experiment showed us two main limitations of the proposed approach, providing us with a direction for future research.
One of these challenges is the amount of manual input required by the system (see the list of parameters requiring manual assignment in Appendix A). While fully eliminating expert input while ensuring the practicality of the system might not be possible, it is desirable to limit the necessary assignments to a minimum.
In this respect, it is desirable to utilize the existing organizational resources e.g., an IT asset management system, configuration management system, vulnerability management system. An IT asset management system if it is implemented in a company [26] can provide a wealth of information about the company assets.
Maintaining the inventory of company assets, an asset management system often also offers the CIA aspects and the criticality values of these assets with their existing vulnerabilities (e.g., ArcSight [3] ). Although limited, information about some dependencies between various assets can be extracted from configuration management system. Generally these tools provide automatic discovery/update of assets (with subsequent manual adjustment as needed).
Nevertheless, no comprehensive off-the-shelf solution is available for capturing information related to potential intrusions and available responses. Considering the amount of research efforts targeting this area with a focus on the use of ontologies and a resource dependency graph [17, 2, 16, 7] , we will incorporate some of the introduced methods in our system in the future.
Another challenge that we encountered during the production deployment of the proposed framework is the difficulty in ensuring the consistent ranking of responses proposed by different administrators. Since the initial goal was to cover several departments, gathering all involved administrators and getting an agreement on the same ranking was difficult. A possible use of ontology or reducing the scale of experiment might help resolve some of these issues as well.
Aside from these issues, the proposed framework aims to provide a consistent guidance to security analysts or system administrators in their intrusion handling process.
At this point our framework primarily focuses on mass attacks often conducted by naive adversary and does not target to address more advanced multi-step attacks with the presence of strategic adversary. Note that certain multi-step attacks can be broken down into a series of steps deemed to be isolated attacks and thus handled by our framework. However, as the future direction we see a potential by incorporating attack graphs into intrusion matrix to be appropriately recognized and addressed.
Another assumption in our approach is the presence of naive adversary who does not take advantage of cost-sensitive response selection to maximize the intrusion damage. A potential future development in this direction is response selection under different adversarial settings ranging from the naive to more intelligent and strategic adversary. The strategic planning from adversary side would potentially require an ability of the framework to infer attacker intent, objectives and strategy to select optimal response. There are number of research efforts in this area focusing on various game theory and economics based approaches to model attacker behavior and optimal defence strategy [15, 14] .
Conclusion and Future work
In this paper we have presented a framework for cost-sensitive assessment of intrusion response selection. The framework incorporates a set of evaluation metrics for practical assessment of costs and benefits associated with the intrusion response selection process.
Specifically, the model identifies three main components that constitute response cost, namely, response operational cost and the response impact on the system. These response metrics provide a consistent basis for evaluation across systems, while allowing the response cost to be adapted with respect to the security policy and properties of specific system environment. To balance the cost of response with its benefits, the model incorporates cost of intrusion damage defined in terms of intrusion operational cost and intrusion damage to system resources. The proposed cost model takes advantage of the accuracy inherent in expert assignment of values, and combines it with a structured calculation of relative values of response and intrusion costs with respect to system resources.
Finally, the framework introduces a balanced approach to response strategy selection for a suspected intrusion according to the security policy of the specified system. The important practical value of the proposed approach is its implementability in a real-world environment which ensures accessibility of response cost assessment to system administrators with a range of system expertise. The proposed approach was evaluated through simulation experiment using DARPA data and through implementation as Snort IDS plugin in real-network environment.
The presented work is an initial step in the direction of establishing standardized response metrics which opens a wide field for future research avenues. One avenue we plan to explore is the role of the individual system resource characteristics in the overall resource value assessment. A second direction is the comparison of cost factors with economic principles, allowing the application of established economic cost models. Au-A Summary of the employed parameters 
